The Issue
Beginning in the early 1990s, several European countries, along with Israel, established health insurance exchanges similar to those launched in the U.S. as part of the ACA. For a Commonwealth Fund-supported study in Health Affairs, researchers gleaned lessons from those countries on how to reduce incentives to engage in risk selection. Insurers can engage in risk selection by steering away high-risk patients in a variety of ways, including purposefully contracting with doctors or hospitals that offer mediocre or substandard care or excluding providers with the best reputations for treating certain diseases.
Key Findings
• Risk selection has been a serious problem in Europe. Health plans operating on the exchanges have marketed products to preferred groups and opened clinics in regions with healthy populations, while closing clinics in communities where health problems are more prevalent.
• The best strategy for reducing incentives for risk selection is to improve risk adjustment so that insurers' reimbursement is aligned with predicted medical expenses. Techniques used in Europe offer some solutions but carry trade-offs. For instance, tying reimbursement to a patient's health care expenses in the previous year reduces the risk of losses but discourages efficiency among insurers. Dutch officials mitigated this risk by,
